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ABSTFUCT 
This paper presents an analysis that indicates that the Reliability 
and Quality Assurance methodology selected by NASA to minimize failures 
in aerospace equipment can be applied directly to biomedical devices to 
project is used as an example of NASA application of Reliability and Quality 
Assurance (R&QA) methods. By analogy a comparison is made to  show how 
these same methods can be used in the development of transducers, instru- 






M improve hospital equipment reliability. The Space Electric Rocket Test 
INTRODUCTION 
Both NASA and the biomedical industry a re  involved in the design and 
operation of important and complex equipment. Furthermore, these sys- 
tems must operate accurately and reliably. Failure can cause economic 
loss; even worse, it can result in the loss of human life. NASA has de- 
veloped an extensive reliability and quality assurance (R&QA) methodology. 
It is possible that this methodology could be used as the basis for an appro- 
priate R&QA program for medical instrumentation. Such a program should 
be aimed at improving equipment performance, reducing failures, and ab- 
solutely minimizing risks of personal injury or death. 
comparable to the early days of the space program. NASA was  faced with 
the task of adapting, advancing and rapidly applying complex technologies 
to accomplish space-flight programs. Historically, the biomedical industry 
has been characterized by the relatively leisurely application of modest 
The bioinstrumentation industry today is in a situation in some ways 
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incremental advances of technology developed by working with animal 
subjects. 
both manufacturers and practicing doctors on the benefits and effects of 
incorporation of these advances. Recently, however, large and rapid 
changes have been occurring in medical instrumentation; the increased 
use of medical electronic apparatus in intensive care hospital facilities 
represents one such dramatic change in biomedical technology. 
That the application of rapid changes in technology can lead to serious 
difficulties, however, can easily be established. A recent survey, (ref. 1) 
of medical electronic gear in 12 Detroit -area hospitals disclosed many 
disturbing findings,. Among its findings are: 
1. Few pieces of equipment are properly maintained; 
2. Simple calibrations like adjusting a potentiometer and simple ad- 
3. Dust is allowed to build up inside chassis, causing components to 
4. Few defibrillators accurately produce the amount of energy they 
5. Most monitoring oscilloscopes and electrocardiographs (ECC) have 
This slow pace in the past allowed extended investigation by 
justments like focusing an oscilloscope a r e  not made; 
overheat; 
a r e  supposed to; 
sub standard frequency response; 
In addition, medical equipment w a s  found to contain the following defects: 
6. Low quality parts were used in construction; 
'7. Planning in the placement of equipment was  poor; 
8. Poor grounding w a s  found in some cases; 
9. Leakage currents were often in excess of the 10 pA level which 
has been recommended by the Veterans Administration and others; 
10. Transient voltage or  current surges often occurred when monitors 
were turned on; 
11* Equipment was  not protected adequately from its operating envi- 
r onment; 
12. Significant waveshape changes occurred in the output equipment; 
13* Equipment was  misused by being operated by untrained personnel; 
Some of these findings a r e  illustrated in figure 1. To overcome similar 
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problems in achieving highly dependable equipment performance, NASA 
developed an extensive methodology for improving, maintaining and veri- 
fying design reliability and product quality of space program hardware. 
That this methodology works can be seen from a representative improve- 
ment in launch vehicles performance. In 1959, only 57 percent of the 
launches met test objectives. In 1967, 93 percent fully met all test objec- 
tives and these later launch vehicles were of larger size and greater com- 
plexity than those of 8 years earlier. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine illustrative parts of the meth- 
odology developed by NASA to achieve equipment reliability. 
many obvious differences between the space and biomedical fields, and 
much that is done to achieve reliability of space equipment is not directly 
applicable in the biomedical areaL. Much of the methodology should be of 
value, however, and its application should solve many equipment 
performance - use problems. 
This space related methodology for  dependable equipment performance 
is based on the careful application of two existing engineering disciplines: 
(1) reliability, and (2) quality assurance. The methods selected for use in 
these disciplines a r e  those found to be effective in the improvement of 
product performance, Reliability engineering is concerned with design 
and testing tasks in product development to ensure that the product is prop- 
erly designed to perform the assigned task without failure. Quality assur- 
ance is concerned with various control methods and qualification testing to 
ensure that the product delivered is manufactured as designed. 
This may sound like an involved way of saying vvbe sure to use good 
engineering practice for each product. v v  Todays complex equipment and 
systems, however, demand the assignment of specific responsibility for 
the WQA tasks and require the application of proven techniques and meth- 
ods. The fact is that biomedical product performance problems do exist; 
the industry must do something about them. 
There a re  
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RELIABILITY 
We will  now consider first Reliability and then Quality Assurance. 
Reliability engineering consists of two fundamental tasks: design 





Each of these subelements is important in achieving a reliable product with 
reliability engineered into the product as it is designed and tested, 
Design Criteria 
A product idea is conceived, and the concept includes general ideas on 
basic functions and performance. Design criteria must be established 
before the actual design is undertaken; some design criteria a r e  listed 
below: 
1. Functional specifications; 
2. Operational requirements; 
3. Environmental specifications; 
4. Parts and materials selection procedures; 
5. Codes, standards, and specifications; 
6. Structural design factors; 
7 a Electromagnetic compatibility. 
Most of these criteria a re  self explanatory, however, if desired, addi- 
tional information is found in existing literature (refs. 2 to 8). 
Referring to parts and materials selection procedures, one of the 
problems identified in the Detroit a rea  hospitals' electronic medical equip- 
ment survey was  p00r parts. One example given was  leaking electrolyte 
from a faulty capacitor causing a resistor in an ECG to short out. NASA's 
way of eliminating weak parts is to require that a specific detailed proce- 
dure for  selecting, qualifying and screening parts, and materials be esta- 
blished. When possible, we  use only those parts which a re  given in 
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Preferred Parts List (ref. 3). Furthermore, 
be subjected to appropriate types of screening 
of course, different for each class of part  and 
it is required that all parts 
test. Screening tests are,  
a r e  based on both engineer- 
ing judgment and experience. They a re  directly related to expected equip- 
ment performance, operating life and environment. Representative 
screening tests might be: 
0 X-ray or vidicon examination to determine contamination and internal 
a Ten complete temperature cycles to temperature extremes, repre- 
configuration; 
sentative of worst case environmenQ measure performance pa- 
rameters before the first  cycle and after East cycle; 
0 Burn-in (full operation) under rated conditions; check performance 
parameters four times at selected intervals to determine the 
trend of parameter shifting; 
The reported Electrolyte leaking from a capacitor could also have been 
caused by insufficient part derating. Electrolytic capacitors normally have 
a rated voltage and temperature specified by the manufacturer. Other 
factors being equal, component-part failure rates increase with s t ress  ap- 
plied in operation. Furthermore, even the best parts when operated at 
maximum-rated s t ress  levels do not have sufficiently low failure rates to 
give highly reliable products. It has been established that, if the voltage 
and temperature s t resses  on an electrolytic capacitor a r e  reduced by a 
factor of 0.7, failure frequency can be reduced by two or three orders of 
magnitude. Therefore, as a design criteria, all electronic piece parts 
should be derated according to those parameters obtained either from 
existing literature or by testing (refs. 8 and 9). 
The environment that a product has to perform in, plays an important 
role in determining design criteria. Space products must contend with 
the harmful effects of such things as vibration, shock, temperature, salt 
spray, fungus and vacuum, Biomedical products would see things like 
vibration, shock, temperature, fluid spills, inexperienced operating per- 
sonnel, dust and dirt  in their hospital. environment. Design criteria must 
reflect the expected environment. 
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Considerations such as these lead to the design criteria for reliabil- 
ity. These criteria establish the degree of conservatism built into the 
product. The reliability engineer has the duty of making certain that ac- 
curate and complete data a re  available on which to base the design cr i -  
teria. 
Design Practices 
Good design practices set many of the constraints for a transfer de- 
vice arrangement. A transfer device is a group of parts which accepts an 
input variable, changes the variable form afid eraasfers the variable to a 
second location for further use, Reliability analysis is very important in 
developing proper design practices for the product transfer device arrange- 
ment. The first step in this analysis is to develop a transfer device dia- 
gram. Using probability methods and the known or  predicted generic failure 
rate of the piece parts combined in transfer device arrangements, the prob- 
ability of success or reliability is calculated. However, neither the num- 
bers  calculated nor the failure frequency functions used a re  necessarily im- 
portant at this point. What is important is the relative standing of the 
various transfer devices, for this establishes a priority listing of items to 
be worked on for improved reliability. A study of these standings is used 
to develop reliability related questions, design practices, representative 
examples of which a r e  listed below: 
1. Are the minimum number of different parts being used? 
2. Is that new transfer device with the high failure rate really neces- 
3.  For the high failure rate items, is redesign or redundancy the 
4. Is the design in suitable farm for  isolating and analyzing test fail- 
Redundancy is the use of two or more sets of selected transfer devices 
sary? 
better approach, or should both be used? 
ures? 
to perform the same transfer. In some cases, it is desirable and should 
be used., in others, it can cause more trouble than it cures. Recognition 
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of these conditions and the trade-offs required to make a reliable produkt 
is the province of the reliability engineer. Examination of the design for  
proper design practice is a continuous part of the design process. 
Design Review 
Design review is conducted in a series of formalized meetings to un- 
cover and resolve hidden weaknesses in a product transfer device arrange- 
ment. 
process: conceptual, intermediate, and final design reviews. 
product a r e  examined. Following the preliminary design review, piece 
parts are selected, specifications are drafted and preliminary drawings 
a re  prepared. 
schematics to establish that the product can do the required job and that 
the transfer devices selected satisfy the design criteria. Now the design 
is ready for a failure modes, effects, and corrective action analysis 
(FMECA). 
and attempts to figure out specifically what the product will  do if certain 
modes of failure should happen. The design is examined in considerable 
detail with the following questions in mind: 
These reviews a r e  usually held during three phases of the design 
During the conceptual design review, the basic transfer devices of the 
The intermediate design review is held to examine design data and 
Here the reliability engineer asks the questions vlWhat if  . . . ?"  
lo How can a part or component fail? 
2. What effect does this failure mode have on product performance? 
3.  How critical is this effect? 
4. Can the failure mode be obviated? 
5. When is the last time that this  failure mode is tested? 
A s  an example of how FMECA is undertaken, consider a thrustor-power 
conditioner block diagram as shown in figure 2. There a re  three subsys- 
tems in this figure: (1) thrustor, (2) neutralizer, and (3) power condition- 
ing. In the thrustor subsystem, the anode supply, V4, and the cathode 
keeper supply, Vl0, were originally voltage controlled supplies (refs. 
10 to 12). The failure mode question was  asked: **What happens if the 
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accelerator V6 a rc s  to some other electrode?9P Since ions a r e  present, 
more a r e  being generated and not being removed, it is very likely that the 
slope of the discharge Volt Ampere (VI) curve wi l l  go negative. If it does 
and there a re  fixed voltages on V4 and Vl0, their currents would only 
be limited by either the number of ions available or  the supply resistances. 
For voltage controlled supplies, current surges could reach failure levels 
very quickly. This possibility was, of course, totally unacceptable and 
w a s  avoided by obtaining a VI curve for these supplies tailored to their 
loads: high starting voltage, constant voltage in the operating discharge 
region and current limited beyond this region. 
the result of FMECA analysis. As design changes from such analyses 
a re  incorporated into a product, the product reliability is substantially 
improved. 
Failure mode data also provides guide lines for setting product tests 
specifications. Each failure mode should be examined during some phase 
of the productBs testing. All  critical failure modes (modes affecting patient 
safety) must be tested. 
The final design review goes over all of the transfer devices to make 
sure that no failure modes have been missed (individually or  collectively) 
and that the final hardware configuration has not altered the intent of the 
design as established during the preliminary and intermediate design 
review. 
selected to transfer power from a three prong wall  receptacle to an elec- 
trocardiograph. During final design review, the question must be asked, 
BtWhat if the ground wire breaks?QP There is considerable evidence to 
show that patient safety is sacrificed (refs. 13 to 15). The detailed design 
properly used a three-wire power cord but no provisions were made to 
check the continuity of the third ground wire. To correct this situation, 
the power cord could be made out of clear plastic insulation and the user 
instructed to check the ground wire for opens with a visual inspection 
prior to each use of the electrocardiograph. Better still, a low current 
This is a real  life example, The design existed and was modified as 
Consider the case where a molded three prong power cord has been 
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ground wire continuity indicator could be placed on the instruments front 
panel and the user instructed never to use an electrocardiograph when 
this light is out (or a fail safe interlock could be provided, etc.). It would 
be tolerable to lose a measurement but not to electrocute a patient acci- 
dentally. It is to uncover deficiencies like this  that a final reliability r e -  
lated design review is held. This too, by the way, is not a hypothetical 
case. A finding of the Detroit Survey was  that 9PX-ray reveals broken 
ground wire in electrocardiograph9 s molded plugs. ' ?  
The product tests task under reliability engineering is heavily con- 
cerned with design evaluation through careful evaluation testing. A bread- 
board model of the product is usually built to verify that the basic transfer 
device arrangement is capable of meeting design criteria. The product 
testing that is conducted on the breadboard model is the first step in design 
evaluation. This testing is usually called functional testing and consists of 
the following types: 
1- Design criteria; 
2. Specification range; 
3. Worst case s t ress  analysis; 
4. Tests for marginality. 
The functional tests prove that the system wil l  work as designed. 
Those tests are conducted for nominal conditions, over the range of input 
and output variables and under worst case electrical and thermal conditions 
for which the product should perform properly (ref. 9). After this is suc- 
cessfully accomplished, the variables a r e  extended (raised and/or lowered) 
usually A 0  percent to see if a slightly out of specification variable wi l l  
cause marginal product performance. 
When a breadboard product has passed functional testing and comes 
through the final design review, prototype products can be fabricated. 
These models a r e  usually made in an experimental shop to get the product 
records ready for production. The new product is now ready for more 
stringent design evaluation testing. 
a r e  repeated; additional representative tests for NASA products a re  listed 
along with comparable tests for biomedical products: 
Functional tests as described above 
NASA Proposed Biomedical 
1. Vibration c 2. Thermal 1; Vibration preferably combined 2.  Thermal 
3. Pressure J 3 .  Shock 
4. Shock 4. Electromagnetic compatibility 
5. Acceleration 5. Corrosive solution 
6. Electromagnetic compatibility 
7. Rain, sand, and fungus 7 Operation by inexperienced people 
the environments it wi l l  experience in service. 
on a spacecraft is often done by advanced s t ress  testing (refs. 7 and 16). 
Advanced s t ress  testing subjects the equipment to environmental conditions 
more severe than wi l l  be encountered in service. The advanced s t ress  
testing is carefully planned to provide predictive performance information. 
Selecting the s t ress  to be used, planning the combinations thereof and the 
increased test levels tends to identify design deficiencies with shorter wait-  
ing periods without affecting the failure modes. 
If at all possible, the environmental tests should be conducted under 
combined conditions equivalent to those the product wil l  see in service. 
Equipment like power conditioning supplies used on payloads or launch 
vehicles, for example, is subjected to launch vibration, temperature, and 
ascent depressurization all in one test. These tests were designed so that 
combined factors were applied as they would occur in service. 
The Detroit Survey found that in a typical hospital environment, saline 
solution could be spilled onto equipment causing corrosion and in some 
cases electrical shorting. The environment also saw dust build-up inside 
chassis, causing components to overheat and fail. Both of these environ- 
mental conditions could have been represented by environmental testing, 
and designs corrected to work reliably in this  environment. Each product 
intended for hospital use with humans should be subjected to environmental 
testing which fully reflects its end use service, True, testing may increase 
the cost of a product but guaranteed no-hazard and reliable performance 
wi l l  most certainly make a premium price acceptable. 
6. Dust and dirt 
During environmental testing, the product is operated in an analogue of 
Qualifying a product for use 
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The next phase in testing is to show that the product has sufficient 
life expectancy for anticipated service. Life testing can be broken up 
into two categories: 
1. Sequential acceptance; 
2. Exhibited mean-time-between-failures (MTBF) 
Sequential acceptance tests help an ethical producer be sure that a product 
lot does fully meet design criteria; it protects the consumer from the pur- 
chase of a defective product (ref. 16). Test constraints can be mutually 
established o r  specified by a manufacturer for review by his  customer. A 
product lot is either accepted, continued on test or rejected based on the 
failure-time performance during this testing. 
The exhibited MTBF test is a life test designed to determine product 
'*wear outq* time by probability methods (ref. 17). Life tests consist of 
operating a product in a typical service environment to determine how long 
it wil l  operate properly. The operation may be either with or without main- 
tenance depending on the expected operating conditions. A power condi- 
tioner for an electric rocket, for example, after reliability engineering, 
was  life tested for  more than 7000-hours maintenance free. The life test 
results supported the engineering prediction that electric rockets were 
ready for long-term space flight tests. 
do not have proper output waveshapes or  energy, and that most monitoring 
scopes and electrocardiographs have substandard frequency response. Such 
design deficiencies can be uncovered during MTBF life testing. If a product 
is placed on life test and operated continuously, initial and regularly re -  
peated detailed performance testing wi l l  disclose aging trends. These can 
be interpreted into predictive curved and reflected in either design appro- 
vals or  design changes or in use specifications. 
To summarize, design problems a re  held to a minimum by building 
products from tested parts, transfer devices, subsystems, and from tested 
systems all interacting together, If something fails during any of this test- 
ing, the failure must be carefully studied to define the exact cause. If the 
failure discloses a design deficiency, the design is changed to preclude such 
The Detroit Cardiac Care Survey also found that aging defibrillators 
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failures and appropriate portions of the design evaluation are repeated to 
verify that the failure mode has been eliminated, 
careful study of each failure. Failure reporting, analysis and corrective 
action is one of the important controls used by Quality Assurance as wil l  
be explained in the next section. Reliability engineering is also concerned 
about each failure report as it relates to three important areas: 
As a part of the test program, there is much to be learned from a 
1. Does this failure exhibit .a design deficiency? 
2. What parts failed and why? 
3. What effect does this failure have on the products exhibited MTBF? 
An example of data produced by product failure analysis is it specific fail- 
ure that occurred when a power conditioning subsystem was  being subjected 
to simulated a rc  testing (see fig. 2). When an a r c  was applied from V5 to 
v6, a sudden failure occurred in the v 6  circuit. A high voltage capacitor 
(0. 1 ,u fd, 600 V) shunting the v 6  current telemetry resistor had cracked 
open. The failure mode was electrical transients overstressing the capac - 
itor during the arc.  The failure analysis determined that the design was  
deiicient in the capacitors rated voltage was too low €or arc transient eon- 
ditions and an RF bypass w a s  not included, The design was appropriately 
modified. When the prototype product successfully completes design evalu- 
ation, final drawing and process specifications are prepared. The first few 
products made by the production department a r e  carefully examined and ex- 
haustively tested for formal qualification of both the product and the produc - 
tion facility. When all of these tests have been successfully completed, the 
product is finally ready for production, sale and public use. The task as- 
signed to Quality Assurance is that of ensuring that production units are 
made in full accordance with the design and all specifications. 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
The best designed product is only as good as the people and materials 
finally used to make it. Quality assurance engineers participate in the task 
of determining that people with the required skills and materials of the 
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specified quality are used to build a product. Quality assurance engineer- 
ing consists of two basic parts, Control and Test. Some of the elements 
under Control a r e  listed below: 
1. Specification review; 
2. Failure analysis and corrective action; 
3. Flight status review. 
Each of the above plays an important part in assuring that a product is 
built as specified. Even though some may appear redundant, harsh exper- 
ience has shown that all of the steps a re  required. Consider first the task 
of specification review. 
Specification Review 
All components for the new product must either be fabricated in-house 
or purchased. Specifications explain just what is required in each compo- 
nent in either case. Some of the usual detailed tasks accomplished by 
quality assurance engineers in this control activity are listed below: 
1. Drawing review; 
2. Configuration review; 
3.  Procurement document review; 
4. Vendor survey; 
5. Fabricated article review; 
6 a Component identification system; 
7. Preservation, packaging, handling, storage, and shipping review; 
8. Training and certification of personnel 
These detailed tasks a r e  either self-explanitory or have been covered 
wel l  in existing literature (refs. 3, 18 to 20). 
It is important that specifications be written as completely and pre- 
cisely as possible. Incomplete specifications can cause much difficulty 
as the following example wi l l  illustrate. Open-to-vacuum power condi- 
tioning equipment was  manifesting a serious internal arcing problem. 
This a r c  is illustrated in figure 3. Various environmental tests were 
made to determine the exact cause (ref. ll), although outgassing w a s  a 
number one suspect. The outgassing specifications required that mate- 
rials used in the power conditioners have (in general terms): (1) low 
volatile content, (2) rapid release of volatiles, and (3) low long-term out- 
gassing rates. A vacuum tank pressure < M O - ~  torr  before startup was  
also specified. Detailed quality assurance tests (fig. 4) determined that 
the power conditioning box pressure was about 2 decades higher than the 
tank pressure. The power conditioning box pressure before startup was  
subsequently specified and a maximum limit given for outgassing after 
bakeout, which corrected this particular problem a 
Failure Analysis and Corrective Action 
When a failure occurs during test, an important data point for product 
improvement has been generated. Each failure should be analyzed to 
identify the specific cause and chain of events. The analysis may uncover 
a subtle design deficiency. Proper corrective action can then be taken to 
eliminate the deficiency. Unfortunately, many product failures result in a 
PFquick fixvt without detailed analysis and testing is resumed without correc- 
tion of the basic defect. Design and manufacturing techniques a r e  not per- 
fect; mistakes, errors ,  and omissions wil l  cause failures. If each failure 
receives a closed-loop analysis and corrective action, future products per - 
formance will be greatly improved. 
The problem of internal arcing in open-to-vacuum power conditioning 
equipment discussed above can also be used to illustrate that failure anal- 
ysis is not fool proof. Outgassing of the power conditioning equipment was  
brought to acceptable levels by bakeout and increasing the venting rate, 
but some internal arcing failures continued. Several other failure modes 
were investiga,ted: magnetic fields, corona and electric fields (ref. ll), 
but failures for internal arcing still persisted. Conformal coating and 
aluminized insulating bar r ie rs  were finally added to reinforce the vacuum 
insulation. These two design changes solved the problem. The final flight 
power conditioner with eonformally coated circuit boards and aluminized 
insulating bar r ie rs  installed is shown in figure 5. The general problem of 
15 
arcing in high voltage circuits in vacuum is by no means completely 
solved, by the way, and further research is underway to better under- 
stand why vacuum is a weak insulator under certain conditions. 
Failure analysis in biomedical equipment would have equal signifi- 
cance and should be conducted in the same closed-loop manner to improve 
in-hospital performance of the equipment. 
Flight Status Review 
It is a NASA policy to fully verify the flight readiness of flight hard- 
ware as a means of providing assurance of mission success. The de- 
tailed control task accomplished by quality assurance engineers in this 
activity is primarily in the area of data review. A flight component is 
considered to be flight ready only if the cri teria listed below a r e  met: 
1. Fabricated to latest released specifications; 
2. Meets all test requirements; 
3.  Date of fabrication, source, serial  number, and history identified; 
4. History does not contain repetitive repair, rework, or modifica- 
5. Life limited equipment identified; 
6, History of stable operation without test anomalies; 
7. Each failure has been analyzed with corrective action to preclude 
8. Each corrective action has been inspected and tested to assure 
9. Condition is not degraded by handling or storage; 
IO. Replacement components handled like flight items; 
11. Launch site activities a r e  carefully planned to  maintain readiness 




on a direct one-to-one basis to biomedical equipment use, but the eleven 
criteria given above illustrate the care -before-use philosophy of quality 
assurance. This same philosophy expressed in concrete well-planned con- 
trol  activity is obviously needed in equipment for use on human patients. 
16 
The problems of productive, informative equipment use and human safety 
are shared by the equipment manufacturer and the using medical facility. 
It seems obvious, however, that an extensive t 9  system planning" activity 
must be undertaken to insure that rooms full of equipment safely and r e -  
liably perform the many interrelated functions intended. This critically 
necessary function is not now being performed. 
ing subdivisions: 





Inspection of all components that go into a product is a necessary con- 
trol function and produces data important to the quality assurance engineer. 
All  components must be made in the same manner as those subjected to de- 
tailed testing if consistent results a r e  to be obtained. Inspection must be 
thorough, and critical parameters must be identified for special attention. 
Component specifications must be consistently checked against and enforced. 
Skilled, experienced, and capable craftsmen a re  required for the inspection 
function. Inspection instructions must be supplemented with experience and 
often extensive training if  effective quality assurance through inspection is 
going to be accomplished. 
Acceptance 
Customer reliance on the manufacturer's inspection alone to insure 
proper product performance is not good practice. Rigorous acceptance 
tests are important to help insure performance. These acceptance tests 
operate the product in an environment analogous to the end use application. 
To illustrate the need for thorough acceptance testing, consider a repre- 
sentative transformer problem. 
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Ow: old friend the open-to-vacuum power conditioner w a s  being corona 
tested. Corona activity was  observed in the V4 supply. Investigation 
showed that the output transformer in the V4 supply, although manufac- 
tured to the qualified open-to-vacuum transformer specifications, w a s  gen- 
erating a corona in the vicinity of the high voltage winding. Figure 6 shows 
the open-to-vacuum transformer construction details and the region in 
which 500 picocoulombs of corona was  occurring. This was  a potential 
failure cause that had to be eliminated; one internal a r c  could fail a power 
conditioner. The judicious use of acceptance testing detected the improperly 
assembled transformer, and prevented it from being installed in the flight 
power c ondit ione r ,. 
Operational 
After the components have been through their individual acceptance 
tests, they a re  assembled and finally placed into the spacecraft. Each sub- 
system is tested. When the subsystem tests a r e  completed satisfactorily, 
a combined systems test is conducted with all subsystems being required 
to operate while interacting with each other under simulated flight condi- 
tions. Figure 7 shows a typical operational test of an electric rocket space- 
craft. Integrated systems testing provides the opportunity to fully assess  
the operation of the completely equipped spacecraft under as many as pos- 
sible of the various environmental conditions and operational modes which 
would be encountered throughout the planned mission. 
At the launch site, the subsystem level tests a r e  repeated to determine 
whether any damage or degradation has occurred during transportation and 
to verify that the flight hardware is compatible with the ground-support 
equipment. Finally, the spacecraft is given a final checkout on the launch 
pad. 
Subsequent to launch and during flight, all data from the flight a r e  
evaluated to ascertain whether the subsystems performed as predicted 
and whether any anomalies occurred. Figure 8 shows a typical flight con- 
trol center for an electric rocket spacecraft. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The methodology described briefly in this report is in no sense a 
"final'' solution to all equipment performance problems. The methodology 
must be prevented from generating a paper blizzard because all the things 
that a r e  discovered must be documented and communicated to others in the 
process of precluding a recurrence. It is important to keep the paper 
work simple, encourage simple language and short forms. Paper cannot 
replace sound, simple engineering evaluation and judgment. The meth- 
odology does serve to reduce very markedly the frequency of human or ma- 
terial failures, but obviously, it w i l l  not completely eliminate them. Also, 
the system canbe costly, sometimes 10 to 15 percent of the equipments 
cost, but it can save much more. 
not by accident. Simple reminders of some of the things that a r e  required 
to achieve reliable products a r e  listed below: 
the part  of qualified individuals. 
It is not easy to achieve reliability; it results from intentional effort 
I. Reliability is designed into a product through conscious effort on 
2. Product design must provide for adequate reliability margins. 
3. Testing is a powerful tool to evaluate a product's design perform- 
ance. The equipment and facilities required to perform full-system en- 
vironmental tests a r e  usually found to be well worth the cost. The product 
must provide for necessary exhaustive testing. 
and must be considered as part of the design process. 
processes and to maintain close adherence to  specifications. 
4. Test specifications a re  important in achieving a reliable product 
5. It is essential to monitor and control the manufacturing and test 
6. Parts must be standarized as much as possible. 
7. Good housekeeping practices must be followed at all times and 
Both the aerospace and biomedical equipment industries a r e  engaged 
places - contamination is one of the major causes of failure. 
in activities characterized by small build rates of the end products - be 
it a cardiac computer or a spacecraft. High reliability is difficult to 
19 
attain, just as difficult to maintain, and even more difficult to improve. 
It is hoped that the experience of NASA wil l  in many ways be of value to 
the biomedical equipment industry and to the medical facilities which must 
use the equipment to produce improved medical care. 
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(a )  Low quality parts were used in  construction. 
Figure 1. - Medical electronics gear findings. 
( b )  Plann ing  in  the  placement of equipment was poor. 





( c )  Poor grounding was found in  some cases. 
Figure 1. - Continued. 
(d )  Equipment was not p ro tx ted  adequately from i t s  operating environment. 
Figure 1. - Continued. 
(e )  Few defibri l lators accurately produce the  amount of energy they are supposed to. 
Figure 1. - Continued. 
( f )  Leakage currents were often i n  excess of the lop, a level which has been recommended by the 
Veterans Ad ministration and others. 
Figure 1. - Concluded. 
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Figure 7. - SERT I1 spacecraft in operational testing. 
Figure 8. - SERT I1 f l i gh t  con t ro l  center. 
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